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During the course of 2007, global ﬁ  nancial markets went through noticeable periods of turbulence. 
In particular, complex credit markets suffered a marked set-back. Oddly, turmoil in these fairly new markets 
contributed to severe liquidity shortages in short-term money and interbank markets, triggering repeated 
large-scale monetary interventions by central banks worldwide. Recent events have thus demonstrated that 
banks are considerably intertwined in ﬁ  nancial markets; dependent on and exposed to them as regards 
liquidity. The aim of this article is to better understand this complex relationship and to frame relevant 
aspects of the latest ﬁ  nancial market turmoil accordingly. In particular, we explore the mechanics of a 
market liquidity crisis and its impact on individual banks’ liquidity, as well as possible spillovers to other 
banks. These dynamics of course raise a number of policy issues. Here, we focus on the role that greater 
disclosure to markets on banks’ liquidity situation itself could play as a market-stabilising device.
In summary, global banks have increasingly integrated into capital markets and in terms of both funding 
and asset liquidity rely considerably on functioning, liquid ﬁ  nancial markets. This is particularly visible in the 
shift towards secured lending transactions; growth of the securitisation market; the broadening of collateral 
to encompass complex products with shifting levels of market liquidity; and the rise in committed credit 
or liquidity lines to sponsored special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and corporates. While some of the recent 
developments in ﬁ  nancial market liquidity can be attributed to technological progress, importantly, more 
temporary factors resulting from an environment of low interest rates have accelerated market liquidity 
beyond sustainable levels. While, per se, banks’ ability to “liquify” assets represents a positive development 
which should help mitigate the fundamental liquidity risk that banks face, increased sensitivity with respect 
to market liquidity risk has also created new vulnerabilities with respect to sudden reversals of market 
liquidity. Importantly, adverse circumstances could trigger a combined increase in demands on liquid assets 
via margin requirements and activation of credit lines and reduced liquidity of assets and related market 
funding sources. The severe loss of liquidity in asset-backed securities markets and its repercussions on 
global interbank markets during 2007 provide a vivid illustration of the channels that link market liquidity to 
banks’ funding and asset liquidity and of the wider externalities of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. How can 
these risks be addressed? Together with active liquidity management, disclosure may represent one tool 
through which such vulnerability may be reduced. A large literature exists on the merits of transparency 
in banking. Greater transparency should alleviate reﬁ  nancing frictions related to asymmetric information. 
When information problems are however deeper and concern aggregate uncertainty, improved disclosure 
on credit fundamentals may be less effective to restore conﬁ  dence. Instead, better information on liquidity 
itself may be necessary. We explore the current availability of information on banks’ liquidity and funding 
risks. Overall, information appears to be limited –failing to disclose in a comprehensive and comparable 
way the underlying dynamics of liquidity demands and funding sources. But liquidity is volatile and banks 
are subject to inherent liquidity mismatches. Can greater disclosure in this area ever be a useful tool to 
reinforce market discipline in a systemically stabilising fashion? While this question merits serious reﬂ  ection, 
the 2007 market events have shown that current information gaps are large and need addressing.
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1| THE RISING INTERDEPENDENCE
  OF BANKS AND CAPITAL MARKETS
Banking disintermediation has been widely 
recognised as one of the key developments to have 
shaped the ﬁ  nancial system in the recent years. This 
is well illustrated by the evolution in the structure
of US household ﬁ  nancial assets. While bank deposits 
represented 36% of those assets at the end of 1980, 
this share had fallen to 19% by 2006, mainly to the 
beneﬁ  t of assets held through institutional investors 
(Chart 1). 
But the shift of investors away from bank deposits 
need not be a permanent ﬁ  xture. Chart 1 indicates 
that, from 1995 onwards, the share of bank assets in 
US household portfolios has more or less stabilised. 
More generally, banks’ balance sheets have strongly 
increased in the recent years. The yearly growth 
rate in total assets of euro area monetary ﬁ  nancial 
institutions (MFIs) was almost 8% between 2000
and 2006 and has recently accelerated to reach, on 
an annual basis, 13% during the three ﬁ  rst quarters 
of 2007. Moreover, funding structures differ across 
banks, with some still relying extensively on customer 
deposits (Chart 2). At a more fundamental level, the 
relationship between banks and markets therefore 
cannot be reduced to a simple question of market 
share, determined by the degree of substitution 
between two channels of intermediation. Nor can 
analysts rely on a casual overview of balance sheets 
Chart 1
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1) Excluding miscellaneous items.
Source: US Federal Reserve
to fully comprehend the intricacies of the two-way
bank-market relationship. In fact, banks and 
securities markets are increasingly intertwined and 
there are many indications of that.
Banks are themselves major issuers of securities. In 
the euro area, they have even become the dominant 
player, the outstanding amount of debt securities 
issued by MFIs having recently exceeded the value 
of government debt securities (Chart 3).
There is also some evidence that banks are making 
more use of derivatives to manage funding risks.1   
Moreover, interbank funding is itself becoming 
increasingly dependent on market liquidity as a 
growing proportion of interbank transactions is 
carried out through repurchase agreements. An 
ESCB survey shows that, between 2000 and 2006, 
the share of secured operations in total euro money 
market transactions has risen from 22% to 30%. 
This increasing reliance on secured operations 
means that banks are mobilising a growing fraction 
of their securities portfolio as collateral. Secured 
funds borrowed by banks are, in turn, used to a large 
degree to lend secured to other market participants.
Chart 2
Liability structure of large European banks
(share in total)





Banco Santander Central Hispano
Société Générale
UniCredito Italiano SpA
Money market funding Interbank liabilities
Equity
Customer deposits Subordinated debt 
and hybrid capital Other funding instruments
Deutsche Bank AG
ING Bank NV
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Other liabilities
Note: Money market funding consists of certiﬁ  cates of deposits, commercial paper 
and other short term money market instruments. “Other funding instruments” 
include funding derived from short term ﬁ  nancial trading and derivatives.
Source: Bankscope
1  See ECB (2007): “Euro money market survey 2006”, February.ARTICLES
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However, the collateral used for both legs of this 
secured borrowing and lending is not necessarily of 
the same nature nor of the same liquidity. In fact, 
banks are increasingly mobilising their traditional 
government and corporate bond portfolios to ﬁ  nance 
less liquid, but higher yielding forms of assets that 
again can be reused as collateral. According to a repo 
market survey published in June 2007, the importance 
of corporate bonds and asset-backed securities (ABSs) 
has been rising steadily.2 The survey also notes a 
sharp rise in equity used in tri-party repos. What we 
observe here are in fact profound changes in liquidity 
management, with a view to higher efﬁ  ciency and 
Chart 3
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lower operational risks.3 Aspects of this shift in 
behaviour include centralisation of certain functions 
of liquidity management and just-in-time payment 
approaches. These changes in collateral and liquidity 
management are not inconsequential, as will be 
discussed in Section 2.
Banks are also increasingly supplying the market 
with new securitised products. Many banks 
originate, structure and repackage in tranches 
illiquid assets which they redistribute to investors 
with corresponding risk preferences. In some 
cases, securitisation represents a new form of 
secured funding to banks. In the US, around 56% 
of outstanding residential mortgages are believed to 
have been repackaged as residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBSs) and sold on to investors, as well 
as 60% of subprime mortgage loans issued in 2006.4 
Securitisation also strongly gained in importance 
in Europe in recent years. Issuance volume grew 
almost sixfold between 2000 and 2006 to reach 
459 billion euro, with also complex products such 
as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) being used 
as securitisation support.
The packaging and repackaging of assets has been 
assisted by the creation by banks of off-balance sheet 
special purpose vehicles (SPVs), the so-called “ﬁ  nancial 
conduits”. Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) 
conduits such as multi-seller programs or structured 
investment vehicles (SIVs) were designed as a 
cost-efﬁ  cient infrastructure to the off-loading of risk 
and access to broad funding markets. It is worth 
noting that already before the summer 2007 market 
events, ABCP issuance was increasingly concentrated 
at the short end of maturity tenors, in contrast to 
non-collateralised commercial paper (CP), suggesting 
increasing rollover risk for this asset category 
(Chart 4).
Bank lending, too, is taking new forms. In addition to 
traditional corporate or retail lending, many banks 
are now lending directly to specialised investors such 
as hedge funds or other highly leveraged institutions. 
These exposures have been collateralised, including 
(until recently) by the newly created classes of assets 
mentioned earlier. In some cases, ﬁ  nancing is also 
contingent, representing back-up credit or liquidity 
lines, for example to ﬁ  nancial conduits. Liquidity 
2  See ICMA (June 2007).
3  See The Institute of International Finance (2007).
4  See “Securitisation: when it goes wrong”, The Economist Magazine, 22 septembre 2007.Articles
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lines provide insurances to CP investors in case the 
conduit faces roll-over risks. While this protects the 
conduit from liquidity risk, it indicates the possibility 
of sudden short-term demands for bank funding –
notably in periods of market turbulence.  
Table 1 provides a snapshot of some of the largest 
European banks’ liquidity exposures vis-à-vis 
conduits recorded before the summer 2007 turmoil. 
Banks are also providing bridge loans to pending 
leveraged buy-out deals or during “ramp-up” 
periods to broker-dealers and have particular links 
with sponsored funds –another potential source of 
contingent cashoutﬂ  ows. ESCB data show that total 
off-balance sheet credit commitments of EU banks 
amounted to close to 17% of on-balance sheet assets 
in 2006, up from very low levels in 2001.5
As a result of all these various developments, banking 
activities are now more deeply embedded in markets. 
This trend is further reinforced by the implementation 
of the new IAS/IFRS accounting standards generalising 
the principle of fair value accounting with the 
consequence that a large portion of banks’ balance 
sheets must now be marked to market.
2| THE ROLE
  OF MARKET LIQUIDITY:
  HOW IT MADE BANKS
  MORE VULNERABLE
  TO MARKET LIQUIDITY SHOCKS
2|1 Market  liquidity
  and banking liquidity
The deepening symbiosis between banks and 
capital markets has probably led to a more efﬁ  cient 
allocation of savings through the ﬁ  nancial system 
and has mitigated the fundamental liquidity risk 
underlying the intermediation of liquid savings by 
banks into illiquid long-term assets. What factors 
have brought this about?
While a number of long-term structural factors are 
clearly at play, importantly, more short-term and 
reversable developments may have helped speed up 
banks’ integration into markets.6 Low nominal and 
real interest rates since 2000 probably stimulated 
increased leverage and risk tolerance (the so-called 
“search for yield”).7 This has led to a proliferation 
of different types of instruments with increasing 
degrees of complexity, some of which were designed 
to maximise returns for a given rating. Low borrowing 
Table 1
European banks with some of the largest liquidity 
facilities to funding ratios








Sachsen Landesbank 24.02 31.60 7.8
IKB Deutsche Industriebank 19.47 28.82 7.2
Hypo Real Estate Bank 17.95 8.70 6.9
Lloyds Bank Group 39.09 7.19 -
Bayerische Landesbank 27.65 6.58 11.0
Calyon 19.39 6.35 9.6
Dresdner Bank 37.77 6.23 10.4
Funding = deposits + senior and subordinated debt based on end 2006
and Q1 2007 numbers; liquidity facilities show maximum commitments.
Source: Citibank
5  See BSC (2007 and 2003).
6  Securitisation has developed also thanks to: the development of statistical models and scoring techniques to standardise risk; legal changes to allow true sale and 
bankruptcy remoteness of SPVs; adjustments to tax systems to avoid double taxation. Some regulatory measures may have also provided incentives to shift exposures 
off-balance sheet. See Kendall and Fishman (2000).
7  See Bernanke, IMF (April 2007) and Bank of England (April 2007).
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costs are also likely to have enhanced market liquidity 
in secondary markets (on-trading) (Chart 5).8
This is because the lower the borrowing costs, the 
cheaper it is for market makers, who provide assets 
on demand and therefore ensure secondary market 
liquidity, to hold certain positions.
In turn, more liquid secondary ﬁ  nancial markets 
allow banks to rely to a greater extent on markets to 
quickly adjust exposures, and to meet unexpected 
funding needs. But market liquidity conditions can 
be subject to sudden “regime shifts” as developments 
in 1997/1998, during 2000 and more recently 
demonstrate (Chart 5), with more detrimental effects 
on banking liquidity than was previously the case.
Banking liquidity risk relates to the inability of a bank 
to meet outstanding obligations at a reasonable cost. 
There are a number of market frictions that can prevent 
a solvent bank from covering a liquidity shortage. 
Asymmetric information represents a major one. 
Investors may have imprecise information on a bank’s 
solvency position, leaving them unwilling to lend, even 
though the bank may be fundamentally solvent.9 As 
will be discussed later, banks’ deeper embeddedness 
in markets has created new information challenges 
for banks. Another possible source of market friction 
affecting banks’  liquidity risk relates to imperfect 
competition. Banks may want to restrict liquidity to 
other banks in order to exploit their failure.10 Banks 
may also be hit by aggregate liquidity preference 
shocks, resulting from increased uncertainty.11
The next section will explore how banking liquidity 
risks interact with market liquidity risks. We 
discuss: ﬁ   rst, the mechanics of a single bank’s 
market-banking liquidity relationship; second, the 
possible dynamics of a market liquidity crisis and 
its implications for overall liquidity in the banking 
sector; and third, illustrate such dynamics with the 
help of market events observed between June and 
September 2007.
2|2 The  mechanics
  of a bank’s market-banking
  liquidity relationship under stress
On the asset side of a bank, securitisation of mortgage 
or corporate loans provides a source of cash to banks 
through the sale of these assets to SPVs. A shift in 
market liquidity for structured assets can lead to 
unintended increases in on-balance sheet exposures 
by banks to warehoused assets and to valuation 
problems with these assets. The resultant pressure 
on earnings and the increase in capital requirements, 
if serious enough, may affect the bank’s access to 
funding markets.
The value of assets held by a bank as a buffer 
against liquidity shocks is also contingent on market 
liquidity conditions. For example, ABSs may be liquid 
at some stage but may suffer signiﬁ  cant haircuts 
and/or valuation uncertainty at other points in time. 
In addition, market liquidity conditions may be 
different across issuing and secondary markets, and 
this difference might be subject to shifts over time as 
well. For some assets, secondary markets may even 
not exist, despite strong issuance. Before the recent 
market turmoil, CDOs had been liquid in primary 
issuing markets, yet secondary market trading 
remained limited, notably for bespoke operations. 
Perhaps, observing robust issuance trends, market 
participants made incorrect inferences about market 
liquidity in secondary markets –notably about the 
effect the absence of such liquidity would have on 
the ability to evaluate assets and adjust portfolios 
under stress. Moreover, a bank’s asset position in 
a particular instrument may be large enough to 
trigger disruptions if its position were partly or fully 
8  Market liquidity risk is typically deﬁ  ned as the risk that market transactions cannot take place and/or only with signiﬁ  cant impact on market clearing prices. See 
Kyle (1985), for a discussion of three key dimensions of market liquidity.
9  See Chari and Jagannathan (1988).
10  For example, Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer (2007).
11  See, for example, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998).
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unwound –again impairing the liquidity of its own 
asset stock.
On the liability side of banks’ balance sheets, 
collateralised borrowing −including in the interbank 
market− also renders banks vulnerable to changes 
in the value and market liquidity of the underlying 
collateral. The broadening of the range of acceptable 
collateral in secured borrowing, especially to more 
complex and less liquid securities, has similarly 
widened the vulnerability to market liquidity shocks. 
Moreover, in periods of stress, margin and collateral 
requirements may increase if counterparties have 
retained the right to increase haircuts or if margins 
have fallen below certain thresholds. In addition, 
if liquidity in the market for the collateral asset 
suddenly dries up, valuation difﬁ  culties and disputes 
may result, as well as lags in transferability of 
collateral and uncertainty about the suitability of the 
collateral, thereby undermining borrowing ﬂ  ows.
Banks may also face unexpected cash outﬂ  ows due 
to the activation of liquidity lines or bridge loans to 
the off-balance-sheet vehicles to which structured 
assets have previously been transferred. A shock to 
the liquidity of these assets can trigger the activation 
of bank liquidity lines if the value of the assets falls 
enough or if funding to the vehicle itself is disrupted 
by the shock. Yet, in some cases, the availability
of (to-be-received) committed lines of credit (or cash 
inﬂ  ows) may not be guaranteed if the situation is not 
covered by the line's terms and conditions.
Collateralised exposures to other market participants, 
such as banks, broker-dealers or hedge funds, 
are also vulnerable to shifts in market liquidity
of the collateral. Besides, some of the less-regulated 
counterparts may themselves be highly leveraged 
and particularly susceptible to market shocks.
Moreover, the fragility of liquidity management in 
periods of stress goes beyond the quantitative effects 
just outlined: past models and historic relationships 
used to manage liquidity risk on normal days become 
obsolete. Consequently, as markets become illiquid, 
it becomes difﬁ  cult to manage out of exposures or 
to hedge. Asset liquidity may no longer depend on 
the characteristics of the asset itself, but rather on 
whether vulnerable counterparts have substantial 
positions that need liquidating.
Finally, the simultaneous pro-cyclicality of these various 
liquidity stresses suggests that banks’ vulnerability to 
market liquidity risks may be greater than what the 
sum of individual risks suggests: deteriorating market 
liquidity conditions can result in reduced liquidity of 
collateral, increased demand for high-quality collateral; 
greater probability of activation of liquidity lines; and 
diminished scope for securitisation.
2|3 The  dynamics
  of a market liquidity crisis
  and its implications for overall
  liquidity in the banking sector
A disturbance in the market can start off with 
a single, perhaps leveraged, market participant 
suffering an idiosyncratic liquidity shock. This might 
occur, for example, because of losses in a particular 
activity, a hedge that has gone wrong, or because 
of operational problems. The participant may have 
to adjust his portfolio as he faces stop-loss levels 
and margin calls.12 In order to generate the required 
cash, he has to sell assets, which may start weighing 
on prices.
Other market participants who have followed 
similar trading strategies may also begin selling, 
but this may be widely anticipated by the rest of 
the market, which has little incentive in being on 
the asset buying side. For example, in 1998, markets 
expected Salomon Smith Barney to ofﬂ  oad  its 
inventory following an article in the press that the 
ﬁ  rm was closing its ﬁ  xed-income proprietary desk. 
As a result, liquidity providers closed their positions, 
waiting for the inventory to be wound down and 
triggering sharp falls in prices of ﬁ  xed-income 
instruments. This in turn negatively affected the 
prospects of LTCM, a hedge fund that had previously 
suffered losses on its Russian bond exposures and 
had to restore cash levels.13
12  See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007).
13  See Bookstaber (1999).ARTICLES
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The liquidity shock to a single institution thus has 
the potential to spread further, either through a 
downward spiral in the price of affected assets or 
by contagion to other, adjacent ﬁ  nancial markets. 
Such a spiral could arise because of an insufﬁ  cient 
number of market makers in a particular market. 
The smaller the number of market makers willing 
to match trades, the more volatile the market will be 
when hit by a shock.14 For example, LTCM seemed 
to have been a key liquidity provider to markets in 
the 1990s. Its exit opened up a big gap in the market 
for ﬁ  xed-income assets, further undermining market 
liquidity.
Agents may also face timing mismatch problems 
because potential buyers require more time 
to analyse the potential shift in fundamentals, 
compared with sellers acting out of urgency to 
meet margin calls. Arbitrage/hedging relationships 
between different markets (e.g. derivative and 
underlying assets) then contribute to other asset 
classes also being affected. Finally, a rise in 
volatilities may blur the information content of 
price signals and increase uncertainty regarding 
fundamentals. These factors may prevent a gradual 
closing of deviations between observed prices and 
what is considered to be their fair value in a wide 
range of markets. 
But because of banking liquidity externalities, 
market liquidity shocks have the potential to 
propagate even further, notably to money and/
or interbank markets, with the potential to 
severely threaten ﬁ  nancial stability. A liquidity 
shock to a bank can be transmitted to another 
bank via classical interbank links, as the former 
withdraws funds to meet its domestic shortage. 
Liquidity shocks can also spread if counterparties 
refuse to provide short-term liquidity because of 
uncertainty over whether someone will lend to 
them if a secondary liquidity shortage arises.15 
Smaller-sized banks with activities in ﬁ  nancial 
markets may also face negative spillovers to their 
retail funding sources. Deposit outﬂ  ows towards 
larger, more systemic banks that are perceived 
as more robust, competent or beneﬁ  ting from 
implicit government support can further weaken 
small banks’ liquidity positions.16
2|4  A recent illustration
  of the market-banking liquidity
  dynamics under stress:
  the June-September 2007
  market turmoil episode
In June 2007, two highly leveraged hedge funds 
sponsored by Bear Stearns suffered considerable 
losses on their USD 20 billion portfolio of ABSs, 
which contained exposures, including via CDOs, to 
subprime RMBSs.17 Margin calls triggered the sale 
of around USD 4 billion of ABSs over a week period, 
driving down prices and undermining conﬁ  dence 
in the market for these assets. AAA-rated CDO 
tranches were increasingly difﬁ  cult to liquidate 
in the absence of a secondary market. In light of 
these developments, the funds’ brokers further 
tightened collateral requirements, including on 
highly rated assets. According to the IMF, haircuts 
during July and August 2007 on AAA-rated ABSs 
and CDOs rose from 2-4% to 8-10% and, consistent 
with this, the cost of insuring AAA home equity 
loans as measured by various ABX indices soared, 
even though there had been virtually no defaults on 
AAA-rated ABSs.18   Some of the large brokers 
themselves held a considerable stock of ABSs, 
which most likely sent additional negative signals to 
markets as regards ultimate clearing prices, further 
undermining market liquidity.
Market disturbances then spread from ABS to money 
markets over the summer 2007, further increasing 
banks’ liquidity risks. Short-term money markets, 
including interbank, CP and ABCP markets, 
experienced falling maturities, rollover problems 
and rising spreads (Charts 6 and 7). Banks relying 
on securitisation funding had to seek alternative 
funding sources, as warehousing risks materialised.19 
In some cases, committed, credit or liquidity lines to 
14  See Allen and Gale (1994); Huang and Wang (2007).
15  See Allen and Gale (2000); Rochet and Vines (2004).
16  See Gatev, Schuerman and Strahan (2005).
17  The subprime residential mortgage market in the US suffered rising delinquencies in 2006 and 2007 as house price inﬂ  ation slowed and interest rate resets kicked in,
resulting in increased uncertainty about the quality of RMBS, including highly rated tranches.
18  See International Monetary Fund –IMF– (September 2007).
19  Fitch (September 2007).Articles
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ABCP conduits, LBOs, and other market participants 
were activated, further increasing demands on bank 
liquidity.20
The effects of the initial market liquidity shock and 
heighted banks’ liquidity risks that resulted possibly 
went beyond levels that can be explained by simple 
interbank links or by exposures to a common shock. 
There may have been some rationing of liquidity 
related to uncertainty about activation of contingent 
claims stemming from ABCP programs. There may 
also have been reputational externalities involved. 
Given asymmetric information, liquidity shortages 
revealed at one bank might have signalled something 
about the banking sector more generally, irrespective 
of the direct interbank exposures. This might 
explain the degree of contagion in equity markets 
from seemingly localised European events, such as 
the revelation of IKB’s problems on 31 July 2007
in Germany to US banks.
Retail deposit funding of smaller-sized banks was also 
negatively affected in late summer of 2007: Northern 
Rock, an “originate and distribute” medium-sized UK 
mortgage lender, was exposed to a run on its retail 
deposits in mid September 2007 when it emerged 
that it had difﬁ   culties accessing securitisation 
markets, a major source of concentration of its 
overall funding. While limited and partial in its 
description of banks’ funding vulnerabilities, a 
simple measure of funding concentration would 
indeed have suggested relatively high levels for 
Northern Rock (Chart 8).
Because of these spillovers between banks and with 
markets, idiosyncratic liquidity shocks generated 
considerable aggregate liquidity shortages in 
August and September 2007, triggering large-scale 
interventions by central banks worldwide.
Chart 6

















Source: Federal Reserve Board
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Note: Based on the Herﬁ  ndahl index. The higher the index the more concentrated 
a bank’s funding. Here, it is normalised to 1 and based on the sum of squares 
of the relative shares of nine funding categories provided by Bankscope. The 
categories are interbank liabilities, retail deposits, wholesale deposits, money 
market funding, mortgage bonds and subordinated debt, other funding, equity 
and other liabilities.
Source: Bankscope, based on largest 100 European commercial banks.
20  The rescue of two German banks, Sachsen LB and IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, were triggered by an inability to honour liquidity obligations to off-balance 
sheet vehicules (see Table 1)ARTICLES
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3| MANAGING LIQUIDITY RISKS:
  THE ROLE OF DISCLOSURE
Banks’ vulnerability to market liquidity shocks has 
clearly increased. To mitigate this fragility, liquidity 
management is of course of crucial importance. It 
encapsulates within a forward-looking maturity gap 
framework the management of liquidity buffers, 
collateral, credit and liquidity lines and funding 
sources. Moreover, banks conduct liquidity stress 
tests to assess their resilience to liquidity shocks, 
including in changed market liquidity conditions. 
Liquidity management practices do of course vary 
across banks, reﬂ  ecting different business models 
and banking environments and partly explaining 
differences in liquidity buffers from one bank to 
another. These differences are illustrated in Chart 10 
in Section 3|3. Individually, certain banks may also 
hold liquidity buffers for strategic reasons, to buy 
up competitors’ assets cheaply when the latter 
experience liquidity problems. Some argue that 
Citibank’s success in the early 20th century was 
based on such a strategy.21 But given that information 
imperfections are at the heart of liquidity risks, this 
section focuses explicitly on the role transparency 
may play in reducing underlying frictions.
3|1 The  beneﬁ  ts and costs
 of  disclosure
The 2007 market turbulence episode has led to 
increased calls for disclosure in the ﬁ  nancial sector, 
largely motivated by a desire to reduce market 
uncertainty. Indeed, a large body of economic 
literature supports disclosure of information to 
investors as a means of reducing asymmetric 
information and hence facilitating a better allocation 
of resources. Greater transparency permits greater 
market discipline, whereby well-managed banks are 
rewarded, while poorly-managed banks are penalised 
with higher costs of capital and deposits. Thus, 
market forces can encourage bank management to 
adopt safer banking practices, lowering the risk that 
market disruptions will become systemic problems.
A related argument put forward is that ﬁ  nancial 
institutions would be less exposed to volatile investor 
behaviour responding to misinformation. Of course, 
a prerequisite for effective use of disclosure is that 
there is a functioning market that can exert the 
necessary discipline on banks (transparency thus 
depends on ﬁ  nancial development).22
That said, even though greater disclosure may be 
socially desirable, market failures may prevent 
sufﬁ   cient provision of information by market 
participants. There are a number of reasons why that 
may be the case. Informational externalities (when 
information about one bank is mistakenly used to 
infer information about another bank) could be one 
of these reasons. This might be because the value
of banks’ assets is correlated, perhaps because banks 
have similar business models, asset compositions, or 
are located in the same region.23 In such a setting, 
the release of negative information by one bank can 
contaminate other banks perceived to be suffering 
from similar problems.
Empirically, the question whether disclosure always 
enhances ﬁ  nancial stability is not settled either. 
In 1989, for example, the US Congress decided in the 
midst of a banking crisis to substantially increase 
disclosure of supervisory information. According to 
Jordan, Peek and Rosengren, the information released 
on supervisory concerns regarding the solvency of 
individual banks during the banking crisis did not 
trigger spillovers to healthy banks.24 Yet, in 2007, 
although transparency about asset compositions 
appears to have been at the core of recent turbulence, 
there does not seem to be a clear relationship between 
disclosure standards in different countries’ banking 
sectors more generally and recent banking-sector 
stock market declines (Chart 9).25
Asymmetries in information, however, may be just 
part of a broader information problem prevailing 
in ﬁ   nancial systems. Uncertainty and imperfect 
information that afﬂ  ict both lenders and borrowers 
to the same extent may also be signiﬁ  cant. A lot 
of work currently focuses on improving disclosure 
on the risks of securitisation products and losses 
experienced in relation to subprime mortgage defaults. 
In this context, investors, banks and markets are all 
21  See Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer (2007).
22 See  Ratnovski  (2007).
23  See Admati and Pﬂ  eiderer (2000); Chen and Hasan (2005).
24  See Jordan, Peek and Rosengren (1999).
25  Of course, share price movements in Chart 9 might also  be driven by other factors.Articles
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struggling simultaneously with the issue of how to 
value complex positions. This suggests that disclosure 
on uncertain credit fundamentals may be insufﬁ  cient 
to restore market conﬁ  dence. Instead, disclosure on 
banks’ liquidity itself might be important. But, as will be 
shown in Section 3|3, current practices in this area 
may suffer from severe shortcomings. 
3|2  Current practices in disclosure
  on banks’ liquidity
  and funding risks
According to the 2001 disclosure survey conducted 
by the Basel Committee, liquidity was one of the 
areas where most progress on disclosure had been 
reported.26 Indeed, a large number of banks report 
positions on liquid assets, notably cash, advances to 
banks or customers; market and non-market funding 
sources and related ratios. Data providers such as 
Bankscope aggregate the various components to 
produce comparable narrow and broad liquidity 
measures across banks.
Figures on loan commitments and liquidity lines 
are also sometimes provided. In some cases, 
banks disclose in their annual reports the amount
of securities pledged and received as collateral, 
lines of credit and degree of secured and unsecured 
lending. Moreover, they also publish liquidity 
gap analyses, showing the banks’ net liquidity 
positions for different maturities. Qualitative 
information typically covers the existence
of procedures and systems to deal with liquidity 
risks such as the setting of liquidity limits and 
establishment of monitoring committees, liquidity 
contingency plans, responsibility of local entities, 
policies on exposure to funding sources and 
limits on unsecured funding gaps. Some banks 
also explicitly reveal stress test scenarios and the 
resultant effects on banks’ liquidity positions.27 
In some cases, central banks conduct such tests 
jointly with a number of banks.28 Rating agencies 
also supply the market with information on the 
strength of banks’ liquidity positions. Short-term 
ratings pick this up explicitly.
In terms of international regulation, there are
few concrete mandatory disclosure requirements 
on liquidity. Under Pillar 3 of the Basel II regime, 
banks’ disclosure is expected to be in line with 
risk management principles and proportional 
to the relevance and materiality of information. 
Speciﬁ  c disclosure requirements largely concern 
Pillar 1 and capital-related risks. Liquidity risk 
is speciﬁ   cally only mentioned in relation to 
securitisation and possibly related liquidity lines.29 
Overall, is this disclosure enough for investors to 
paint an accurate picture about liquidity risks in 
the banking sector?
3|3  Issues in liquidity disclosure
Firstly, starting off with liquidity buffers, they can 
only imperfectly capture the liquidity risk of a bank. 
The book value of assets may differ from the liquidity 
they can generate. Haircuts on liquid assets vary with 
market conditions and this is not captured by simple 
static balance sheet statistics. Moreover, narrow 
liquidity buffers shown in Chart 10 only report a 
fraction of “true” liquid assets –some government 
bonds held outside the trading portfolio (but which 
Chart 9
Global banking sectors’ initial share price correction 
and global bank disclosure index
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Sources: Datastream; World Bank
26  See BCBS (2003): “Public disclosure by bank: results of the 2001 disclosure survey”.
27  See, for example, Deutsche Bank.
28  See Janssens, Lamoot and Nguyen (2007) for Belgium.
29  Furthermore, when speciﬁ  cally considering the issue of liquidity risks in banks, the Basel Committee states in its “Sound practices for managing liquidity in banking 
operations” (2000) that “each bank should have in place a mechanism for ensuring that there is adequate disclosure of information about the bank in order to manage 
public perceptions of the organisation and its sound management (principle 13)”.ARTICLES
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are potentially very liquid) are for example excluded, 
but are covered by the broader liquidity measure. 
How banks categorise assets across the balance 
sheet thus affects the size of liquidity buffers and 
comparisons made between banks. In addition, the 
broad measure shown in Chart 10 excludes securities, 
such as equities which may be liquid, while it includes 
other assets –such as less liquid interbank loans with 
longer-term maturities.
Different buffer measures may also tell different 
stories over time. In Table 2, changes in classiﬁ  cation 
of debt securities and changes in accounting rules 
may partly explain why a narrow liquid asset ratio (1) 
indicates a sharp fall in liquidity buffers between 
2001 and 2006, while a broader measure (2) suggests 
the opposite.30
Similarly, on the basis of the reported assets 
and liabilities, it may sometimes be difﬁ  cult to 
determine whether a given security is available,
i.e. if it could be used in a repo transaction or not. For 
instance, although government bonds are generally 
considered to be liquid, they may have a liquidity 
value of zero if they already have been mobilised in 
a secured transaction, although they are still present 
on the balance sheet.31 Indeed, in repos, the value of 
securities remains on the borrowing bank’s balance 
sheet despite the potential transfer of ownership.
Banks can also use the cash derived from repo 
transactions to borrow less liquid securities in 
reverse repos. This again would not be recognised 
on the balance sheet. Liquid asset positions recorded 
at one point in time may thus appear more liquid 
than they really are.
Secondly, some banks centralise liquidity 
management, which of course affects liquidity ratios 
of the individual entities and of the consolidating 
group. A measure at group level is appropriate 
if  liquidity can easily circulate among all the 
entities of a group, if there are no legal obstacles to 
its transfer across national borders and if solidarity 
among all the group entities is ensured.
Finally, liquidity buffers should be compared with 
potential liquidity needs on the liability side of the 
balance. A gap or cash ﬂ  ow analysis that matches 
incoming and outgoing ﬂ  ows of cash for several 
maturity buckets captures better the time dimension 
that lies at the heart of liquidity risk management. 
However, publicly-available information does not 
allow outsiders to construct an accurate gap analysis 
for individual banks. For instance, in terms of 
funding risk, while there may be information on 
the maturity of funding sources, this does not reveal 
much about the ease with which these sources could 
be renewed and how concentrated they are. In sum, 
Chart 10
Liquidity buffers across large European banking 
groups
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Source: Bankscope
30  Note, however, that changes over time may also be affected by changes in the underlying sample.
31  The data in Chart 10 however adjust for pledgeability.
Table 2
Liquid asset ratios of EU banks
(% of total assets)
2001 2006
Cash 1.2 1.4
Debt securities 21.7 5.6
Shares/other ﬁ  nancial assets booked 
through P&L 3.7 22.2
(1) Liquid asset ratio (cash + debt) 22.9 7.0
(2) Liquid asset ratio [(1) + shares/other 
ﬁ  nancial assets] 26.6 29.2
Source: BSC (2003) and (2007), 2006 data only refer to IFRS reporting countries.Articles
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maturity gap reporting does not explicitly reveal 
the mechanisms of liquidity management and its 
underlying complexity.
Previous sections illustrated the difﬁ  culty inherent 
in assessing a credit institution’s liquidity risk, 
especially on the basis of limited public information. 
A better assessment of liquidity risk may therefore 
require improved disclosure practices. The deﬁ  nition 
of best practice with regard to disclosure is no easy 
task, however.
As already mentioned, the lack of comparability 
between the data currently disclosed by banks raises 
questions. With the generalisation of IAS/IFRS, 
reporting across banks should become more systematic 
and comparable. But given the principles-based 
approach of IAS/IFRS, disclosure may still differ in 
many cases. Taking the example of loan commitments, 
banks will continue to have signiﬁ  cant leeway as to 
how they report on these contingent exposures. The 
amount of disaggregation of liquid assets available 
to make industry-wide comparisons will also remain 
limited: “due to banks” (which typically accounts for 
the largest part of liquid assets) covers a broad range 
of exposures, including short-term collateralised 
loans. Disclosure of liquidity lines to conduits depends 
on the degree of consolidation, which itself is open 
to interpretation, depending on whether the bank 
“controls” the SPV or not. Recent events suggest that 
the perimeters of risk consolidation may need to be 
reconsidered for disclosure to be meaningful.
It might also be difﬁ  cult for markets to draw relevant 
conclusions across banks on the basis of qualitative 
information currently disclosed by banks. For example, 
on stress tests, it is difﬁ  cult for outsiders to assess 
whether a bank’s stress test assumptions are internally 
consistent and how the severity of assumed shocks 
compares across banks. The following quote, taken from 
the 2006 Annual Report of Northern Rock, illustrates 
this point: “The Group’s liquidity policy is to ensure that 
it is able to meet retail withdrawals, repay wholesale funds 
as they fall due, and meet current lending requirements. 
[...] This is achieved by managing a diversiﬁ  ed portfolio 
of high quality liquid assets, and a balanced maturity 
portfolio of wholesale and retail funds.”
Given that liquidity is volatile, contingent and 
complex, the question relating to the frequency and 
comprehensiveness at which information should be 
provided is an important one. In many countries, 
banks disclose relatively frequently signiﬁ  cant details 
on their liquidity position to supervisors. In Belgium, 
for example, the scope of reporting to supervisors 
has recently been enhanced.32 If supervisors beneﬁ  t 
from these data, should they not be made available 
more widely?
Precisely because of its volatile nature, high frequency 
liquidity information can easily be misinterpreted and 
thus create destabilising “noise” in markets. There 
is a risk that by “forcing ﬁ  rms to talk on liquidity”, 
solvent institutions –but with a vulnerable liquidity 
position– could be subject to runs. Predatory trades 
and strategies discussed earlier could be encouraged 
if it is well known who is cash-rich and who is 
cash-poor, potentially curtailing the provision of 
liquidity to solvent institutions. Market liquidity 
could also dry up if markets anticipate the unwinding 
of large portfolios in particular assets by vulnerable 
counterparts –as was mentioned in Section 2 in relation 
to the LTCM crisis. Yet, perhaps if comprehensive 
and frequent reporting on liquidity ﬂ  ows (instead of 
stocks at a particular point in time) had already been 
released ex ante, institutions might have behaved 
more conservatively in “liquid” times, thus avoiding 
the erosion of liquidity under stress. Assuming such 
discipline is achievable, on which aspects should 
disclosure focus?
The multidisciplinary working group suggested in 
2001 exploring the possibilities of more transparency 
on funding sources and on market liquidity risks.33 
Instead of static ratios, banks could be requested to 
publish the output of VaRs that explicitly factor in the 
risk of reduced market liquidity and to explain funding 
sources, including risks of concentrations. In addition 
to what was suggested at the time, regulators could 
request banks to publish more comprehensive 
information on liquidity risk management systems, 
comparable details of stress tests and funding 
contingency plans. Moreover, information on liquidity 
and funding ﬂ  ows, the components and counterparts 
and ﬂ  uctuations over time could be helpful, as well 
32  See Janssens, Lamoot and Nguyen (2007).
33  See “Multidisciplinary working group on enhanced disclosure”, BCBS, CGFS, IAIS, IOSCO (2001).ARTICLES
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as an analysis of how these ﬂ  ows feed into and affect 
banks’ balance sheets. Finally, in the spirit of recent 
reports, it might be useful if rating agencies monitored 
regularly –on a no-external-support basis– banks’ 
robustness vis-à-vis liquidity risks.34
But would these suggestions really help in enhancing 
banks’ resilience to liquidity shocks and overcome 
problems related to imperfect information and 
aggregate uncertainty? To answer this question, 
one would  ﬁ   rst need to address some of the 
following deeper issues: can the market really 
play a disciplining role as regards banks’ liquidity 
management or do markets only take an interest in 
liquidity once it has become a problem? In other words, 
to what extent will markets continuously monitor 
potential future tail liquidity events –especially 
if they  expect to count on central bank liquidity 
interventions? For example, assuming that markets 
knew about Northern Rock’s funding concentration, 
why did they not put pressure on the bank earlier 
by raising borrowing spreads? Could mandatory 
disclosure as suggested above make any difference 
and encourage banks and markets to give more weight 
to liquidity issues in normal times? While these 
questions merit deeper reﬂ  ection and further work, 
the 2007 market events have clearly shown that current 
information gaps are large and need addressing.
34  See, for example, Fitch’s ad-hoc report (2007): “Liquidity analysis of US securities ﬁ  rms”, August.Articles
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